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ABSTRACT 
Credit constraint is considered by many as one of the key barriers to adoption of modern agricultural 
technologies, such as chemical fertilizer, improved seeds, and irrigation technologies, among smallholders. Past 
research and much policy discourse associates agricultural credit constraints with supply-side factors, such as 
limited access to credit sources or high costs of borrowing. However, demand-side factors, such as risk-aversion 
and financial illiteracy among borrowers, as well as high transaction costs, can also play important roles in 
credit-rationing for smallholders. Using primary survey data from Ethiopia and Tanzania, this study examines 
the nature of credit constraints facing smallholders and the factors that affect credit constraints. In addition, 
we assess whether credit constraints are gender-differentiated.  Results show that demand-side credit constraints 
are at least as important as supply-side factors in both countries. Women are more likely to be credit constrained 
(from both the supply and demand sides) than men. Based on these findings, we suggest that policies should 
focus on addressing both supply- and demand-side credit constraints, including through targeted interventions 
to reduce risk, such as crop insurance and gender-sensitive policies to improve women’s access to credit.  
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Limited access to credit has been highlighted as a major impediment to agricultural technology adoption among 
smallholder farmers in developing countries (Feder et al. 1990; Feder and Umali 1993; Fernandez-Cornejo and 
McBird 2002; Carter and Olinto 2003; Guirkinger and Boucher 2008; Abate et al. 2016; Khandker and Koolwal 
2016). Past research mostly identifies the principal factors behind credit constraints among smallholders as 
supply-side factors such as limited availability of alternative credit sources in local areas, unavailability of 
financial products that suit the needs of smallholders, or high costs of borrowing. Consequently, improving 
credit access through policies that mitigate these supply-side constraints is often recommended as an effective 
strategy to boost technology adoption and productivity. However, improving credit access via the easing of 
supply-side constraints may not necessarily increase credit uptake and technology adoption if it is not 
accompanied by efforts to tackle demand-side factors that could limit the demand for credit (de Janvry et al. 
1991; Woutersen and Khandker 2013; Adjognon et al. 2017). In other words, limited credit uptake does not 
necessarily imply that farmers are unable to obtain credit; it could just be that they have sufficient liquidity to 
invest using their own resources or that high transaction costs may inhibit their participation in credit markets 
or that they are afraid of losing their collateral (Feder et al. 1990; Adjognon et al. 2017). 
Even if supply-side constraints were removed, for example, by lowering the interest rate, farmers may not 
borrow for several reasons, including (i) collateral requirements and repayment schedules that most 
smallholders cannot afford, (ii) risk-aversion, specifically fear of an inability to pay back loans and the 
subsequent loss of collateral;  (iii) farmers finding the option of investing in inputs using resources from crop 
sales or other off-farm income sources to be more economical than using loans; and (iv) high transaction costs 
associated with complex loan application procedures. In addition to supply-side constraints, these demand-side 
factors can play an important role in the functioning of agricultural credit markets and credit rationing to 
smallholder borrowers. When credit is rationed by factors other than interest rates, liquidity can become a 
binding constraint resulting in sub-optimal resource allocation (Feder et al. 1990; Boucher et al. 2008, 2009; 
Simtowe and Zeller 2006; Khandker and Koolwal, 2016).   
Empirical evidence is lacking in our understanding of the nature and causes of  credit constraints, whether 
credit constraints emanate from the supply- or the demand-side, and whether credit constraints are a limiting 
factor for adoption of agricultural technologies such as improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers. Empirical 
analyses of  the credit-constraint status of smallholders,  the factors that affect this status, and whether credit 
access could facilitate technology adoption would help build the evidence base needed to guide appropriate 
policy interventions  to alleviate the different credit constraints facing smallholders. In this regard, for instance, 
if demand-side factors such as risk aversion are the main causes of low credit uptake, a financial product that 
integrates credit with an insurance mechanism can be considered (Shee and Turvey 2012; Shee et al. 2015; Shee 
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et al. 2019). On the other hand, if low demand for credit results from lack of business aspirations or limited 
knowledge about alternative credit sources, then improving farmers’ financial literacy, access to relevant 
information, and their entrepreneurial skills can be important. Finally, supply-side constraints such as high 
interest rates may require interventions targeted at reforming the structure and conduct of rural financial 
intermediaries. 
Using primary survey data collected from a sample of small-scale irrigators and non-irrigators in Ethiopia and 
Tanzania under the Feed the Future Innovation Laboratory for Small-Scale Irrigation (ILSSI) project, the 
objectives of  this study are to (1) identify the credit constraint status of smallholders; and (2) examine the 
factors affecting the credit-constraint status of smallholder farmers.1 Study households are grouped into three 
categories based on their credit-constraint status: those who are not credit constrained, those facing supply-side 
constraints, and those facing demand-side constraints.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 presents a brief overview of the research 
literature on the linkages between credit constraints and agricultural technology adoption. Section 3 describes 
the methodologies (data and econometric models) used in the study. Sections 4 and 5 present our descriptive 
and econometric results, respectively. The final section concludes the paper with key policy recommendations. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The classical works of Singh et al. (1986) and de Janvry et al. (1991) suggest that with market imperfections, 
households’ decisions on production and consumption simultaneously indicate that intensity of input use will 
be dependent on the availability of capital and initial endowments. Those who face binding credit constraints 
may well be able to afford only sub-optimal levels of input use that can translate into levels of productivity well 
below the first-best outcome. Farmers may be constrained to suboptimal low-risk/low-return agricultural 
investments (Dercon and Christiaensen 2011). This reduces output per unit of land, income, and ultimately 
welfare. Relaxing liquidity constraints and enhancing households’ endowments (for example, family labor) will 
have a positive impact on households’ productivity (Feder et al. 1990; Guirkinger and Boucher 2008).  
The rationale for expanding credit access rests on the notion that marginal returns to capital investments in 
developing countries are large enough to justify the costs of credit (de Mel et al. 2008; Fafchamps et al. 2011; 
Duflo et al. 2013). Credit access offers farming households the liquidity they require to purchase agricultural 
inputs, adopt technology, or undertake other investments that are associated with higher yields and to increase 
their capacity to make longer-term investments. Despite the flourishing of microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
 
1 ILSSI is an action-oriented, farmer-centered research project supported by the Feed the Future program through the United States 
Agency for International Development and implemented in Ghana, Ethiopia, and Tanzania. It aims to investigate and understand the 
technical and socio-economic factors, constraints, and opportunities of small-scale irrigation technologies towards achieving 
sustainability and efficiency in resource utilization (water, land and other resources) and enhance the livelihoods of smallholder farmers. 
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and the significant progress in many countries, most rural households in developing countries remain 
underserved (Karlan and Morduch, 2009; Karlan et al. 2010). This is particularly the case for countries like 
Ethiopia and Tanzania, where rural financial markets remain in their infancy and are mostly dominated by 
informal financing schemes. For instance, Amha and Peck (2010) reported that most households in Ethiopia 
remain underserved. A recent World Bank global financial inclusion study shows that only 22 percent of adults 
in Ethiopia have access to financial services, with corresponding figures for Africa south of the Sahara and the 
globe amounting to 29 percent and 62 percent, respectively (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2015). Wiedmaier-Pfister et 
al. (2008) estimate that about 80 percent of the potential demand for financial services in Ethiopia remains 
unmet. Ironically, despite the estimated large unmet demand and the low coverage of microfinance, most 
households in the ILSSI survey report that they did not apply for loans because they either have enough money 
or do not need a loan (for instance 81 percent of sampled households in Ethiopia and 21 percent in Tanzania 
did not apply for loans because they reported they have enough money). There is some evidence that seems to 
support this. Adjognon et al. (2017) show that traditional credit use, formal or informal, is extremely low and 
farmers primarily finance modern input purchases with cash from nonfarm activities and crop sales. Tied 
output-labor arrangements appear to be a widely used form of credit for farming.  
Recent empirical studies have shown that microcredit can stimulate agricultural investments, including use of 
modern agricultural inputs (Giné and Yang 2009; Zerfu and Larson 2010; Abate et al. 2016); facilitate the start-
up of new enterprises (de Mel et al. 2008) and, at least in some cases, reduce poverty (Berhane and Gardebroek 
2011). Hailu et al. (2014) report that credit access is important for the adoption of agricultural technologies. 
Liverpool and Winter-Nelson (2010) indicate that microfinance has positive effects on the use of improved 
technology, asset growth, and consumption. Abate et al. (2016) report that access to institutional finance (loans 
from cooperatives) has a significant positive impact on both the adoption and extent of use of agricultural 
technology in Ethiopia. Many studies suggest that credit access is an important determinant in adoption of 
irrigation technologies such as treadle- and fuel-powered motorized pumps (Adeoti 2009; Gebregziabher et al. 
2014; Getachew et al. 2013).  Namara et al. (2014) noted the upper quintile of farmers tend to adopt small-scale 
irrigation technologies, because poorer households are unable to afford them outright and lack access to 
finance.  
In terms of methodological approaches, most of the studies reviewed above investigated the general 
determinants of adoption by including credit (loosely defined as an “access” vs. “lack of access” binary variable) 
as one of the variables affecting it, in multi-variate regression model frameworks. Such frameworks do not 
explain the nature of credit constraints among smallholders. A more elaborated study on credit and fertilizer 
adoption in Ethiopia, Croppenstedt  et al. (2003), applies a double hurdle model and shows credit to be both 
supply- and demand-constrained. Boucher et al. (2009) developed a strategy to identify credit-constrained 
households and showed that credit constraints may take three forms: quantity rationing, transaction-cost 
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rationing, and risk rationing. Each form adversely affects household resource allocation and thus should be 
accounted for in empirical analyses of credit-market performance. The authors further outline a survey strategy 
to directly elicit households’ status in the credit market as unconstrained or constrained and, if constrained, to 
further identify which of the three nonprice rationing mechanisms is at play.  
Following the Boucher et al. (2009) direct elicitation approach of classifying constrained and unconstrained 
households, Ali et al. (2014) reported that unconstrained households have higher levels of purchased inputs use 
and yields, suggesting a link between access to credit and agricultural productivity. Following the same 
approach, Mukasa et al. (2017) reported that, using a panel of 5,308 smallholder farmers, around 66.6 percent 
were credit constrained, most of them (71.9 percent) due to risk factors and transaction costs (14.33 percent). 
Mukasa et al. (2017) indicate that access to financial information, increasing the number of branch offices of 
banks and MFIs in rural areas, and easing financial transaction costs might increase farmers’ access to credit 
and significantly alleviate their credit constraints and would generate substantial productivity gains. Khandker 
and Koolwal (2016), using a household-level fixed effects model on household panel data spanning over 20 
years in Bangladesh, show that institutional finance has benefited households with lower land ownings. 
Institutional finance has helped such households to raise agricultural income from activities, such as livestock 
rearing, that require less land and also helped all households with nonfarm income diversification, but with the 
strongest effect for landless or near-landless households. In this study, we adapted the Boucher et al. (2009) 
approach for identification of the credit-constraint status of smallholders based on the responses to the 
Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) module in the ILSSI survey.  
3. METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Data 
Data for these studies were collected in 2017 under ILSSI in Ethiopia and Tanzania. The Ethiopia survey 
covered 533 households drawn from 15 villages (Kebeles) and four districts (Woredas) in Ethiopia. The Tanzania 
survey collected data from 512 households drawn from 15 villages and three districts. The ILSSI surveys 
collected detailed data on household characteristics, land use and irrigation, plot-level input use, production, 
livestock ownership, and membership information of households, among others. In addition, the WEAI 
modules were implemented: data were collected from both the main male and female decision makers in the 
household, including data analyzed here on credit access and constraints. The richness of these datasets allows 
us to construct a typology of households based on the source of credit constraints (supply versus demand side). 
The WEAI datasets consist of 1,021 respondents in Ethiopia (only 45 households had a single respondent) of 
whom 51.8 percent were women; and 882 respondents in Tanzania (142 households had a single respondent) 
of whom 57.6 percent were women. This sample composition allows us to examine gender differences in credit 
constraints. Additional details about ILSSI surveys can be found in Mekonnen et al. (2019).  
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3.2 Conceptual framework 
To guide the empirical analyses of credit constraints and their potential effects on technology adoption, we 
adapted the Boucher et al. (2009) framework for a household credit constraint identification strategy 
summarized in Table 1. The credit constraint status of a household can be unconstrained, supply-side 
constrained, or demand-side constrained.  
(a) Unconstrained households consisted of either satisfied borrowers, that is, borrowers who obtained the 
amount requested; or non-borrowers who did not need loans or who preferred to work with their own 
liquidity.  
(b) Supply-side constrained households consisted of rejected loan applicants; unsatisfied borrowers, that is, 
those who received less than the loan amount requested; or non-borrowers who perceived that their 
application, if made, would be rejected. 
(c) Demand-side constrained households are risk-averse households or other non-borrowers that consider the 
transaction costs of acquiring a loan to be too high and hence not worth it.  
Our classification of credit constraint is based on responses to several credit-related questions included in the 
WEAI module. A direct elicitation method, like the Boucher et al. (2009) and Ali et al. (2014) studies, allows us 
to make comparisons between constrained and unconstrained borrowers. Borrowers who tried to get credit, 
whether they were successful or not, reveal their demand for credit, thereby allowing for an empirical analysis 
of their credit behavior. Similarly, households that would have liked to borrow but did not apply or attempt to 
borrow due to various factors, such as fear of risk, lack of collateral, or high transaction costs, also possess a 
positive, though unrevealed, demand for credit. Such households can also be classified as credit constrained 
due to demand-side constraints. Using the identification strategy portrayed in Table 1, we classified households 
either as “supply-side constrained,” “demand-side constrained,” or “unconstrained” and analyzed the factors 
that affect their credit status. This classification can also help to assess whether their credit status affects 
adoption of agricultural technologies. 
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Table 1. Identification strategy of credit constraint status of smallholders 
Unconstrained Constrained: Supply-side Constrained: Demand-side 
  
   
Due to risk-
aversion 








Applied or otherwise 
attempted to obtain a 
loan. Ready to pay the 
existing interest rate, but 
loan application rejected. 
Non-
borrowers 





Do not know any 
lenders, for 
example, lenders 
not located nearby 
Non-
borrowers 
Do not need a 
loan; have 
enough money 
Borrowers Unsatisfied borrowers: 
Obtained less than the 
amount of loan 
requested; wanted a larger 













with their own 
liquidity, that 
is, reason for 
not borrowing 
is “do not like 




perceive themselves to 
" certainly be rejected”: 
Were certain that their 
loan application would be 
rejected due to 
inadequate collateral; past 
credit history; existing 




Do not want to 
be worried; 
afraid. 
Need to pay bribes, 
too much politics 
involved 
Source: Authors’ representation. 
 
Some of the variables we used to categorize respondents into demand- or supply-side constrained households 
may be argued to belong to both categories. For instance, an interest rate (as a price for the loan) can be 
considered both as a demand- and supply-side constraint. Likewise, both borrowers and lenders can view 
transaction costs as a constraint. But as transaction costs are more of a borrower’s actual or perceived factor 
hindering loan applications, we included transaction costs as demand-side constraints, consistent with past 
studies (Boucher et al. 2009; Ali et al. 2014). Importantly, only a handful of households in our survey reported 
to be credit constrained due to interest rates and transaction costs; thus, the classification does not substantially 
affect our identification strategy.  
3.3 Econometric approach  
A multinomial probit (MNP) model is a commonly used probability model when a categorical outcome 
(dependent) variable has more than two categories, for example, the type of insurance contract that an individual 
selects; the type of crop a farmer decides to  grow; and the type of fertilizer applied. In such a situation, the 
dependent variable 𝑦𝑦 is an unordered categorical variable and an individual may select or fall under one of the 
alternatives. The choices can be coded as 𝑗𝑗 = 0, 1, … ,𝑚𝑚, where 𝑚𝑚 is the number of categories. We estimate an 
MNP assuming a standard normal probability density function of the model error term.  
In our empirical analysis, we let 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  be the categorical variable that takes values 𝑗𝑗 = 0, 1, 2 that represent the 
credit constraint status—that is, unconstrained, supply-side constrained, and demand-side constrained, 
7 
respectively—of the 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ household. Defining 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  as the unobserved propensity of the 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ household to be in 
credit constraint status 𝑗𝑗, we get Equation 1: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  =  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ′ 𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
The observed category is the one with the highest propensity. The MNP probability model in which the 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ 
household falls into the 𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ credit constraint status can thus be (Equation 2): 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗) =  𝑃𝑃�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  > 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ � =  ɸ(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ,⩝ 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑘𝑘 (2) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the probability that the 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ individual falls into the 𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ credit constraint category, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′ is a 
vector of regressors, 𝛽𝛽 is the parameters to be estimated, and ɸ is a probit functional evaluator. The variables 
included in the empirical model are presented in Table 2.  
4. DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the descriptions and measurements of the variables used in the analysis. The variables used in 
the analysis include socio-demographic variables (such as respondents’ age, family labor, and education level); 
household wealth (such as household income, livestock, and land ownership); social capital– and information-
related variables (such as membership in local associations and market information); and financial capital (such 
as access to microcredit institutes and community savings/credit groups).   
8 
Table 1. Descriptions of the variables used in the study 
Variable name  Variable type  Description and measurement 
Credit constraint status variables   
ss_side_constrained  dummy Supply-side credit constrained households (=1; otherwise 0) 
dd-side_constrained dummy Demand-side constrained households (=1; otherwise 0) 
credit_constraint_status dummy Credit constraint status: (0=unconstrained, 1= ss-side constr., 2=dd-side-constr.) 
Credit_status_binary dummy Credit constraint status of a household (0 = unconstrained; 1 = constrained) 
Socio-demographic variables   
head_female dummy Sex of the household head (=1 if female, otherwise 0) 
sex_respondent dummy Sex of the respondent (=1 if female, otherwise 0) 
head_age continuous Age of the household head (in completed years) 
head_educ. continuous  Years of formal schooling (in completed years) 
Educ1560 continuous  Education attainment of adult members of the household (average number of years) 
head_marital dummy Marital status of household head (=1 if head is married, 0 otherwise) 
hh_size continuous  Number of household members (head count) 
hh_labour continuous  Number of economically active members of the household (aged 15-65) (head count) 
Wealth/assets indicators   
Log_income continuous Log of total estimated household annual income (in Ethiopian Birr) 
TLU_total continuous  Total livestock size (tropical livestock unit [TLU])  
land_area continuous  Total land size owned by the household (ha)  
Local financial access indicators    
Iqub_member dummy Household belongs to an Iqub (community savings/credit) group (=1 if member; 0 otherwise) 
MFI_member dummy Household belongs to a credit or microfinance group (=1 if member; 0 otherwise)  
Social capital, information access, irrigation practice  
wateruser_member dummy Household belongs to a water users’ group (=1 if member; 0 otherwise) 
Nonwater_group dummy Household belongs to any local community association (=1 if member; 0 otherwise) 
Irri_plot dummy Household has at least one irrigated plot (1=yes; 0 otherwise)  
Irri_num_plot continuous  Number of irrigated plots on the household farm (#) 
Info_access_irri dummy  Do you have access to information on irrigation options/methods? (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 
Info_climate dummy Respondent has access to weather/climate-related information (1= yes; 0 otherwise)  
Info_market dummy Respondent has access to market information (1= yes; 0 otherwise)  
Source: Authors’ collation of variables from Feed the Future Innovation Laboratory for Small-Scale Irrigation (ILSSI) surveys.
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4.1 Credit constraint status of smallholders  
Following the identification framework depicted in Table 1, smallholders’ credit constraint statuses in Ethiopia 
and Tanzania are presented in Table 3. A series of credit-related questions was asked in the WEAI module. 
These questions include whether anyone in the household applied for a loan, the reason(s) for applying or not 
applying for a loan, and the amount of loan received relative to what was requested. As noted above, responses 
to these questions were used to distinguish three types of households based on households’ credit status: 
unconstrained, supply-side constrained and demand-side constrained.  
Table 3. Credit constraint status among smallholder farmers (by country) 
 Ethiopia Tanzania 
Applied or attempted to borrow (yes=1), (%) #  48.9 46.4 
Average amount received (Ethiopian Birr, Tanzanian Shillings) * 9,507.4 455,000.0 
Supply-side constrained households:  
(6.7% Ethiopia, 10.1% Tanzania) † 
Rejected borrowers (as a % of applicants) 6.8 5.3 
Unsatisfied borrowers (as a % of applicants) - - 
Perceived "certainly rejected” nonapplicants (as a 
% of non-applicants) 
6.9 1.4 
    
Demand-side constrained households:  
(9.5% Ethiopia, 42% Tanzania) † 
Due to risk-aversion behavior (as a % of 
nonapplicants) 
15.3 69.6 
Due to high transaction cost (as a % of 
nonapplicants) 
5.0 19.9 
    
Unconstrained households: 
(86% Ethiopia, 54.6% Tanzania) 
Received full amount wanted (as a % of 
applicants)  
93.2 94.7 
Did not need a loan (as a % of nonapplicants)  80.5 20.5 
    
Credit constrained households (yes=1) †  (% of sampled households) – either supply- or 
demand-constrained or both 
14.0 45.4 
Source: Authors’ computations from Feed the Future Innovation Laboratory for Small-Scale Irrigation (ILSSI) survey 2017 (Ethiopia and Tanzania). 
#Yes/No to Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index [WEAI] questions: (Y4.01) Did you attempt to borrow from any source (cash or in kind) in 
the last 12 months? & (Y4.04) Did members of your household attempt to borrow from [source] in the last 12 months? 
*This average is in terms of Ethiopian Birr for Ethiopia and Tanzanian Shilling for Tanzania. 
† The sum of supply-side and demand-side constrained households does not add up to total credit constrained households because some households are 
both demand and supply credit constrained. 
Unconstrained farmers are those who have applied for loans and got approved for the amount they requested 
or farmers who did not apply for loans because they did not need the loan. This accounts for 86 percent and 
55 percent of sampled farmers in Ethiopia and Tanzania, respectively.  Forty-nine percent of sampled farmers 
in Ethiopia and 46 percent in Tanzania had applied for loans or attempted to borrow from different sources 
(Table 3). Of loan non-applicants, 81 percent in Ethiopia and 21 percent in Tanzania stated that they did not 
apply for a loan because they did not need one (Table 3). Of farmers who had applied for loans, 93 percent in 
Ethiopia and 95 percent in Tanzania received the loan amount they requested. The level of approval for the 
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full amount requested by farmers does not statistically differ between formal and informal sources of credit. 
The average loan amount was 9,507 Ethiopian Birr in Ethiopia (396.7 in USD) and 455,000 Tanzanian Shillings 
(203.4 in USD).  
The second credit constrained group is supply-side constrained households and it is made up of farmers who 
have applied for loans but had their loan rejected or farmers who did not apply because they perceive that their 
loans will be “certainly rejected.” Supply-side constrained households make up 6.7 percent and 10.2 percent of 
sampled farmers in Ethiopia and Tanzania, respectively.  
The third credit constrained group is demand-side constrained households. For these households, constraint 
stems from risk-aversion behavior (such as the fear of losing collateral or not being able to make repayments 
in general) as well as high transaction costs (such as long distance from the financial intermediary) that can 
suppress demand for credit. Demand-side constrained households made up 9.5 percent and 42 percent of 
sampled households in Ethiopia and Tanzania, respectively. Constraints that stem from risk-aversion behavior 
are reported to be the most limiting demand-side constraints.  
4.2 Purpose of loans and reasons for not applying or for loan rejection  
Purchase of livestock is the single most frequent reason for farmers to take a loan in Ethiopia, where it accounts 
for 45 percent of total loans (Table 4). Purchases of agricultural equipment and inputs for crop production 
(such as land, tractors, fertilizer, seed, pesticide, and hired labor) account for 30 percent and 51.5 percent of the 
loans in Ethiopia and Tanzania, respectively. Irrigation-related costs such as the purchase of motor pumps or 
tube-wells account for 1 percent or less of the loans in the two countries. Credit for household consumption 
(both food and non-food) accounts for 10 percent and 18 percent of the loans in Ethiopia and Tanzania, 
respectively. This may be related to the fungibility of loans taken, since consumption loans are not common in 
both countries. Non-farm-business-related loans such as those for starting a non-farm enterprise and 
purchasing a business vehicle account for 11 percent and 15 percent of the loans in Ethiopia and Tanzania, 
respectively (Table 4). Other household expenses such as paying rents (for housing or for land) or taxes; paying 
for education, travel costs, and medical expenses; and paying off old loans or debts account for 18 percent and 
30 percent of the loans in Ethiopia and Tanzania, respectively.  
Inadequate collateral, bad credit history or a default history with the lender, and outstanding loans are some of 
the reasons for loan rejections, while no reason was provided for 46 percent and 64 percent of loan rejections 
in Ethiopia and Tanzania, respectively (Table 4). However, loan rejections are less frequent as only 28 loan 
applications out of 499 applications in Ethiopia and 17 out of 409 applications in Tanzania were rejected. Of 
farmers who did not request credit, 15 percent in Ethiopia and 69 percent in Tanzania did not do so due to the 
fear of the risk of default. In Tanzania, the fear of losing collateral and the overall fear that they may not be 
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able to pay back the loan taken were the key reasons not to apply for a loan for 46.5 percent and 35 percent of 
non-applicants, respectively. 
Table 4: Summary of the reasons for loan request, loan rejection, and loan non-request (by country) 
 Applicants (received) 
Purpose of loan (loan utilization) * (Ethiopia =441) (Tanzania=396) 
Agric-crops 30.20 51.50 
Irrigation-related 0.00 1.30 
Livestock purchase 44.90 0.30 
Construction/housing/assets 2.30 4.30 
Consumption 9.80 18.20 
Non-farm business 10.90 14.90 
Social 1.80 0.50 
Others 18.40 30.10 
 Applicants (rejected) 
Reasons for rejection (Ethiopia=28) (Tanzania=17) 
Inadequate collateral   64.30 29.40 
Bad credit history 3.60 11.80 
Outstanding loan 7.10 5.90 
Default history with lender 0.00 11.80 
No reason given 46.40 64.70 
 Non-applicants 
Reasons for not attempting to borrow (Ethiopia=522) (Tanzania=473) 
No need for loan/have enough money 80.50 20.50 
Afraid of losing collateral 8.00 46.50 
Cannot pay the money back 12.30 34.70 
Inadequate collateral 3.60 10.60 
Had outstanding loan 2.90 1.10 
Past history of default 0.00 1.50 
Bad credit history 0.40 1.90 
Interest rates too high 3.80 11.60 
Lenders not located nearby 0.40 3.20 
Procedures too cumbersome 0.80 7.00 
Need to pay bribes 0.00 0.40 
Family dispute in borrowing 0.40 2.70 
Others 1.00 5.30 
Source: Authors’ computations from Feed the Future Innovation Laboratory for Small-Scale Irrigation (ILSSI) survey 2017 (Ethiopia and Tanzania). 
* Note: In the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI) survey instrument, we had long lists of items under the 
“purpose of loan.” We clustered the lists into the following categories (the numbers in the parentheses are the codes used in the 
survey instruments for each item):    
- Agricultural —crops = (1) Agricultural production; (2) Purchase of agricultural land; (3) Purchase of tractor; (4) Purchase of 
thresher; (6) Purchase of other farm equipment; (14) To buy farm inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides); (12) To pay hired 
labour. 
- Irrigation-related = (5) Purchase of tube-well; (7) Purchase of irrigation pumps 
- Agricultural —livestock = (13) To buy livestock 
- Construction/housing/assets = (17) Purchase/improvement of family dwelling; (23) To buy a car 
- Consumption (food and non-food) = (9) To buy food/household goods; (16) Other consumption 
- Non-farm business = (19) For start-up of a non-farm enterprise(s); (20) For new investment in a non-farm enterprise(s) 
(difference between start-up and new investment); (24) To buy a business vehicle 
- Social = (21) To pay for a wedding; (22) To pay for a funeral 
- Others = (8) To pay rent (for housing or for land) or taxes; (10) To pay for education; (11) To pay for travel costs; (15) 
Medical expenses; (18) To pay off old loans/debts; (25) Other, specify. 
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4.3. Characteristics of loan seekers and non-seekers 
Tables 5 and 6 summarize the comparative statistics of loan seekers and non-seekers by household- and 
respondent-level characteristics, with some statistically significant differences. In Ethiopia, loan seekers are 
about 3.5 years younger, more likely to be in male-headed households (by about 5 percentage points), operate 
a smaller land size (by about 22 percent), have lower non-employment income (by about 38 percent), and are 
more likely to have access to information about irrigation, markets, and agricultural production compared to 
non-seekers. In addition, loan seekers are less likely to be irrigators or to be a member of an Equb2, and more 
likely to be members of MFIs and other group memberships compared to non-seekers (Table 5). In addition, 
female-headed households, households with older heads, and low-income households are more credit 
constrained in Ethiopia (Table 5). Female-headed households are more credit constrained by about 5 percentage 
points than male-headed households. Households with access to local MFIs are less likely be credit constrained 
(by about 16 percentage points) compared to those that do not have access to MFIs. Farmers that actively 
participate in several social and local groups are less credit constrained in Ethiopia.  
In Tanzania, loan applicants are about 2 years younger, have lower gross expenditure per year (by about 18 
percent), have a slightly larger household size, and are more likely to be members of MFIs, water users’ groups 
and other types of groups compared to non-applicants (Table 6). In both Ethiopia and Tanzania, loan applicants 
are more likely to be poorer (as measured in land size, annual gross expenditure, or access to irrigation) than 
non-applicants. In addition, households with older and less educated heads, and those with lower livestock 
income, are more credit constrained in Tanzania (Table 6). Irrigators in Tanzania are less likely (by about 9 
percentage points) to be credit constrained compared to non-irrigators.  
 
2Equbs are community-based revolving savings and credit associations that provide credit and insurance outside the 
formal financial sector. 
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Female-headed household (yes=1) 0.112 0.061 0.051 0.005 0.081 0.133 -0.052 0.042 
Household head age (years) 47.943 44.387 3.557 0.000 45.919 48.599 -2.679 0.013 
Household head education (years) 3.273 3.506 -0.233 0.357 3.351 3.563 -0.212 0.560 
Household size  5.974 6.104 -0.129 0.321 6.070 5.818 0.252 0.178 
Dependency ratio 0.556 0.535 0.021 0.078 0.543 0.563 -0.019 0.268 
Operated land area (ha) 1.716 1.345 0.369 0.000 1.558 1.457 0.101 0.352 
Livestock owned (TLU) 91.722 88.485 3.237 0.952 94.114 66.331 27.783 0.716 
Employment income (ETB)* 13906.820 14594.071 -687.251 0.959 10848.550 34957.400 -24108.850 0.203 
Livestock income (ETB) 5475.901 4878.753 597.149 0.278 5328.399 4406.364 922.035 0.243 
Gross income (non-employment) per year (ETB) 49967.350 31185.080 18782.270 0.004 43517.860 27440.350 16077.510 0.090 
Information access on:          
Irrigation (yes=1) 0.788 0.873 -0.085 0.001 0.835 0.783 0.051 0.130 
Climate (yes=1)  0.692 0.664 0.028 0.344 0.683 0.650 0.033 0.433 
Crop production and management (yes=1) 0.831 0.909 -0.079 0.000 0.872 0.839 0.032 0.294 
Livestock production and management (yes=1) 0.803 0.902 -0.099 0.000 0.864 0.762 0.101 0.002 
Market (yes=1) 0.725 0.788 -0.064 0.018 0.753 0.762 -0.009 0.809 
Equb membership (yes=1) 0.295 0.239 0.057 0.042 0.272 0.252 0.021 0.610 
MFI membership (yes=1) 0.230 0.588 -0.358 0.000 0.418 0.259 0.159 0.001 
Mater users’ group membership (yes=1) 0.186 0.177 0.009 0.725 0.180 0.196 -0.016 0.649 
Number of group membership 3.567 4.277 -0.710 0.000 3.968 3.454 0.513 0.001 
Irrigation status (irrigator=1) 0.427 0.336 0.091 0.003 0.389 0.363 0.025 0.573 
Total fertilizer use (kg) 181.582 172.214 9.367 0.389 179.323 164.465 14.858 0.341 
Total improved seed use (kg) 34.715 35.129 -0.414 0.952 32.888 47.309 -14.421 0.139 
Total pesticide cost (ETB) 886.524 671.399 215.125 0.014 812.320 630.559 181.761 0.149 
Source: Authors’ computations from Feed the Future Innovation Laboratory for Small-Scale Irrigation (ILSSI) survey 2017 (Ethiopia and Tanzania). 
Note: *ETB (Ethiopian Birr) =the currency of Ethiopia (1 USD = 37. 60 ETB, in November 2020); MFI = microfinance institution; TLU = tropical livestock unit. 
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Female-headed household (yes=1) 0.103 0.124 -0.021 0.316 0.127 0.098 0.029 0.176 
Household head age (years) 49.764 47.638 2.126 0.011 47.780 49.938 -2.158 0.011 
Household head education (years) 7.052 7.418 -0.366 0.132 7.515 6.879 0.636 0.009 
Household size  5.144 5.475 -0.331 0.013 5.375 5.209 0.166 0.218 
Dependency ratio 0.524 0.525 -0.001 0.956 0.533 0.515 0.018 0.191 
Operated land area (ha) 2.264 2.078 0.185 0.205 2.188 2.161 0.027 0.853 
Livestock owned (TLU) 0.569 0.663 -0.095 0.775 0.640 0.580 0.060 0.856 
Employment income (TZS)* 2270000.000 1740000.000 538000.000 0.322 2030000.000 2014225.320 15774.680 0.977 
Livestock income (TZS) 72134.410 95262.590 -23128.180 0.186 96922.200 66376.250 30545.950 0.082 
Gross expenditure per year (TZS) 10277431.000 8467410.000 1810021.000 0.045 9120000.000 9790000.000 
-
670000.000 0.457 
Information access on:          
Irrigation (yes=1) 0.795 0.818 -0.022 0.409 0.814 0.797 0.016 0.555 
Climate (yes=1)  0.880 0.842 0.038 0.104 0.851 0.875 -0.025 0.297 
Crop production and management (yes=1) 0.787 0.803 -0.017 0.551 0.814 0.772 0.041 0.136 
Livestock production and management (yes=1) 0.465 0.518 -0.053 0.113 0.518 0.455 0.064 0.060 
Market (yes=1) 0.533 0.489 0.044 0.191 0.498 0.530 -0.032 0.344 
MFI membership (yes=1) 0.159 0.362 -0.203 0.000 0.328 0.168 0.161 0.000 
Water users’ group membership (yes=1) 0.222 0.285 -0.064 0.029 0.286 0.210 0.076 0.009 
Number of group membership (a maximum of 
16 groups) 7.348 7.333 0.015 0.931 7.542 7.100 0.442 0.011 
Irrigation status (irrigator=1) 0.342 0.341 0.002 0.965 0.382 0.292 0.089 0.005 
Total fertilizer use (kg) 79.739 143.334 -63.596 0.463 137.750 76.134 61.616 0.478 
Tot improved seed use (kg) 21.581 23.059 -1.477 0.781 23.496 20.815 2.681 0.615 
Total pesticide cost (TZS) 55066.160 49666.090 5400.070 0.481 57574.720 46413.780 11160.940 0.147 
Source: Authors’ computations from Feed the Future Innovation Laboratory for Small-Scale Irrigation (ILSSI) survey 2017 (Ethiopia and Tanzania). 




5. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS  
5.1 Determinants of credit constraint status of households  
Using the identification strategy depicted in Table 1, smallholders were classified into credit unconstrained, supply-
side credit constrained, and demand-side credit constrained. Table 7 reports the results from the MNP regression 
model with the unconstrained group used as a base category. Hence, the likely effect of each covariate on the credit 
constraint status is interpreted against this base category. A set of explanatory variables including socio-
demographics (such as respondents’ age, family labor, and education level); wealth/asset indicators (such as 
household income, livestock, and land ownership); social capital and information-related variables (such as 
membership in local associations and market information); and financial capital (such as access to microcredit 
institutes and community savings/credit groups) were among the conditioning variables we considered. To capture 
gender-differentiated credit constraints, we introduced two indicators of gender: “Respondent_female” and 
“head_female.” As described in section 3, the WEAI module of the ILSSI surveys was designed to collect responses 
from both members (male and female) of the couple heading the household.   
As shown in Table 7, the two important gender variables, being either a “female respondent” or a “female-headed 
household,’ are statistically significant in affecting the credit constraint status of a household in both study countries. 
In Ethiopia female respondents are more likely to be supply-side credit constrained (that is, lenders are less likely 
to lend to female applicants) and in Tanzania female respondents are more likely to be demand-side credit 
constrained either due to risk perception or transaction costs. This model prediction is consistent with the 
descriptive statistics reported in Section 5.1. Such gender-differentiated credit constraints in rural Africa are well 
documented in previous studies. For instance, in a study in northern Ghana, Balana (2016) reports that as a result 
of local traditions, culture, and norms, women have less access to collateral, such as land and livestock, which gives 
them lower chances of getting loans; the loan terms and conditions were too rigid to suit women’s needs; and 
women have relatively limited knowledge about credit and are more often illiterate and unable to complete the 
paperwork needed for formal credit. In addition, married households in Ethiopia are more likely to be both supply-
side and demand-side constrained in accessing credit, possibly indicating increased risk aversion.  
Examining the common set of factors (both supply-side and demand-side) that determine credit constraint status 
in the two study countries, we see that  access to MFIs and having an established social network (proxied by  
membership in local associations) are important factors in easing credit constraints (Table 7). Households with 
better access to MFIs and those with established social networks are less likely to be credit constrained from both 
the supply and demand sides (significant at the 1 percent to 10 percent levels). Further, female-headed households 
are less likely to be demand constrained in Ethiopia and less likely to be supply-constrained in Tanzania, relative 
to male-headed households.  
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Table 7. Estimation results of MNP regression models 
 Ethiopia Tanzania 
Supply-side constrained Demand-side constrained Supply-side constrained  Demand-side constrained 
Independent variables Coeff. Std. err. p-value Coeff. Std. err. p-value Coeff. Std. err. p-value Coeff. Std. err. p-value 
 Respondent_female (=1) 0.299* 0.170 0.078 0.178 0.174 0.306 -0.130 0.166 0.432 0.332** 0.134 0.013 
 head_marital (married=1) 1.025** 0.478 0.032 1.627*** 0.457 0.000 -0.336 0.283 0.236 0.052 0.248 0.834 
 head_female (=1) -0.779 0.477 0.102 -0.857* 0.466 0.066 -0.676* 0.338 0.045 -0.116 0.273 0.670 
 head_age (years) 0.004 0.009 0.685 0.012 0.008 0.149 0.003 0.007 0.691 0.015*** 0.006 0.008 
 head_edu (years) 0.019 0.031 0.549 -0.016 0.029 0.582 0.036 0.029 0.203 -0.002 0.022 0.943 
 edu1560 (#) 0.035 0.038 0.360 0.077** 0.040 0.058 -0.098** 0.039 0.012 -0.137*** 0.031 0.000 
 hh labor (#) 0.003 0.060 0.965 0.030 0.066 0.648 -0.146** 0.071 0.041 0.035 0.056 0.529 
 log_gross_income  -0.183* 0.104 0.079 -0.132 0.129 0.307 -0.012 0.012 0.315 -0.017** 0.010 0.082 
 TLU_total -0.079*** 0.033 0.017 -0.033 0.037 0.361 0.003 0.017 0.846 0.006 0.014 0.675 
 land_area (ha) 0.035 0.077 0.646 -0.130 0.096 0.178 0.001 0.038 0.983 0.034 0.032 0.295 
 groupmem_num (#) -0.103* 0.061 0.092 -0.306*** 0.093 0.001 -0.085*** 0.032 0.008 -0.026 0.027 0.328 
 info_access_market (yes=1) 0.221 0.226 0.328 0.196 0.195 0.316 0.248 0.176 0.159 -0.269* 0.140 0.055 
 info_process (yes=1) 0.085 0.210 0.688 -0.544** 0.244 0.026 -0.056 0.183 0.758 -0.383*** 0.147 0.009 
 micro_member (yes=1) -0.363* 0.201 0.071 -0.287 0.202 0.156 -0.448** 0.199 0.025 -0.814*** 0.157 0.000 
 equb_member (yes=1) 0.007 0.213 0.974 0.572*** 0.244 0.019 - - - - - - 
 Constant -1.965 1.198 0.101 -2.145 1.429 0.133 0.754 0.617 0.222 -0.302 0.503 0.548 
Mean dependent var 0.210 SD dependent var:   0.556  Mean dependent var:  0.800 SD dependent var:  0.925   
Number of obs   1008 Chi-square:   81.465  Number of obs:    851 Chi-square: 109.522   
Prob > chi2  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC): 974.585  Prob > chi2:  0.000 Akaike crit. (AIC): 1542.018 
Source: MNP regression results using Feed the Future Innovation Laboratory for Small-Scale Irrigation (ILSSI) survey data (Ethiopia and Tanzania) 






Livestock ownership is an important factor (statistically significant at the 1 percent level) in easing supply-side 
credit constraints of smallholders in Ethiopia. However, in Tanzania livestock is not a significant factor in 
determining either the supply-side or demand-side credit constraint status of a household. As livestock is an 
important measure of household assets or wealth in Ethiopia, ownership of livestock could either substitute 
for credit or could serve as an indicator of the household’s capacity to borrow or bear risks (Croppenstedt et 
al. 2003), hence lenders may be more willing to lend to applicants with large livestock holdings. Interestingly, 
the size of landholding is not statistically significant in influencing either the demand- or supply-side constraint 
status of a household. This may reflect land-tenure insecurity (for example, in Ethiopia) where land cannot be 
used as collateral. Table 7 further shows that members of Equb in Ethiopia are more likely to be demand 
constrained, possibly because an Equb can serve as an alternative source of financing.  
The results further reveal that there are specific sets of factors that differentially affect demand-side and supply-
side constrained households. For the demand-side constrained households, a key factor that influences credit 
constraint status is the level of access to information (proxied by “info-market” and “info-processing” variables). 
Households having good access to information are less likely to be demand-side credit constrained. Similar 
findings have been reported in previous studies in Nigeria. For instance, Wossen et al. (2017) show a positive 
relationship between credit access and information integrated into extension services. This relationship has a 
practical policy implication because rural borrowers do not appear to be well connected to information sources 
to inform their credit decisions. They may lack adequate information on sources of credit, on the terms and 
conditions for obtaining credit, or on interest rates. Given these findings, key policy questions include: How to 
improve rural information and communication systems, including for agricultural production and marketing? 
How to enhance households’ access to information technologies, including telephone and internet services?  
5.2 Marginal effects of covariates on credit constraint status of households 
Tables 8 and 9 report predicted marginal effects, that is, the effect of a one-unit change in an explanatory 
variable on the percentage probability of a household being in each of the credit constraint categories. At the 
bottom of both Tables 8 and 9 are the predicted probabilities of households being credit unconstrained, supply-
side constrained, and demand-side constrained. The predicted probabilities are consistent with the actual 
descriptive summary statistics reported in Table 3. Based on predicted results, demand-side credit constraints 
are equally or even stronger than the supply-side constraints in both countries. In Ethiopia, supply-side factors 
are almost as important as demand-side factors (6.3 percent and 4.7 percent, respectively). In Tanzania, 
however, only 10 percent of households are supply-side constrained whereas 34 percent of households are 
predicted to be demand-side constrained (Table 9). This is an interesting finding in that many studies highlight 
that the credit constraints smallholders face are mostly due to supply-side factors—for instance, an absence of 
accessible credit sources in local areas, an absence of credit products that meet the needs of smallholders, and 
a high cost of borrowing. Consequently, improving credit access by mitigating these supply-side constraints has 
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been recommended as an effective policy to boost agricultural technology adoption. However, our findings 
show that credit constraints are not only from supply-side factors but from demand-side factors as well. In our 
data, the demand-side factors appear to be even stronger than the supply-side factors in Tanzania and are 
comparable with the supply-side factors in Ethiopia. Thus, improving credit access by easing supply-side 
constraints may not necessarily address potentially suboptimal uptake of credit among smallholders in Tanzania 
and Ethiopia without equally addressing demand-side factors (de Janvry et al. 1991; Woutersen and Khandker 
2013; Adjognon et al. 2017). The reason some non-borrowers do not participate in the credit market may not 
necessarily be due to inability to obtain credit but, rather, due to risk aversion or lack of access to information 
on potential sources of credit or on the terms of the credit that is available. Our empirical findings provide 
strong evidence on the wide prevalence of demand-side credit constraints in the two countries.  
Table 8. Marginal effects of regressors on probability of a household being credit constrained (Ethiopia) 
 Unconstrained households Supply-side constrained  Demand-side constrained  
Independent variables dy/dx Std. err. P>z dy/dx Std. err. P>z dy/dx Std. err. P>z 
 Respondent_female (=1)    -0.035*     0.019     0.069     0.026*     0.015     0.096     0.010     0.013     0.438 
 head_marital (married=1)    -0.185***     0.055     0.001     0.076*     0.043     0.080     0.109***     0.036     0.002 
 head_female (=1)     0.084***     0.026     0.001    -0.046**     0.021     0.031    -0.038     0.016     0.015 
 head_age (years)    -0.001     0.001     0.278     0.000     0.001     0.808     0.001     0.001     0.152 
 head_edu (years)    -0.001     0.003     0.883     0.002     0.003     0.499    -0.001     0.002     0.508 
 edu1560 (#)    -0.008*     0.004     0.086     0.002     0.003     0.489     0.005*     0.003     0.070 
 hh labor (#)    -0.002     0.007     0.765    -0.000     0.005     0.986     0.002     0.005     0.646 
 log_gross_income      0.023*     0.013     0.075    -0.015     0.009     0.104    -0.008     0.009     0.412 
 TLU_total     0.008**     0.004     0.026    -0.007**     0.003     0.020    -0.002     0.003     0.544 
 land_area (ha)     0.005     0.009     0.571     0.005     0.007     0.502    -0.010     0.007     0.152 
 groupmem_num (#)     0.011     0.008     0.143     -0.013**     0.005     0.021    -0.024***     0.006     0.000 
 info_access_market (yes=1)    -0.029     0.022     0.189     0.017     0.018     0.342     0.012     0.013     0.367 
 info_processinfo (yes=1)     0.021     0.023     0.361     0.013     0.020     0.513    -0.035***     0.013     0.006 
 micro_member (yes=1)     0.046**     0.021     0.029    -0.029*     0.017     0.082    -0.017     0.014     0.226 
 equb_member (yes=1)    -0.043     0.029     0.129    -0.006     0.018     0.725     0.050**     0.023     0.033 
Pr(credit constraint status):  Pr(0)=0.8890  Pr(1)=0.0631  Pr(2)=0.0478 
Source: Post-estimation marginal effects (after MNP regression) using Feed the Future Innovation Laboratory for Small-Scale 
Irrigation (ILSSI) survey data (Ethiopia).  
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. dy/dx = discrete change of dummy variable for a unit change in a regressor; hh = household; 
MNP = multinomial probit; TLU = tropical livestock unit. 
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Table 9. Marginal effects of regressors on probability of a household being credit constrained (Tanzania) 
 Unconstrained households Supply-side constrained  Demand-side constrained  
Independent variables dy/dx Std. err. P>z dy/dx Std. err. P>z dy/dx Std. err. P>z 
 Respondent_female (=1)    -0.062*     0.036     0.087    -0.037*     0.021     0.082     0.099***     0.035     0.004 
 head_marital (married=1)     0.020     0.067     0.766    -0.055     0.045     0.221     0.036     0.062     0.567 
 head_female (=1)     0.069     0.072     0.334    -0.067***     0.026     0.009    -0.002     0.071     0.978 
 head_age (years)    -0.003**     0.002     0.021    -0.000     0.001     0.576     0.004***     0.001     0.006 
 head_edu (years)    -0.003     0.006     0.664     0.005     0.004     0.164    -0.003     0.006     0.653 
 edu1560 (#)     0.038***     0.009     0.000    -0.006     0.005     0.258    -0.032***     0.008     0.000 
 hh labor (#)     0.004     0.015     0.795    -0.022**     0.009     0.016     0.018     0.015     0.213 
 log_gross_income      0.005*     0.003     0.077    -0.001     0.001     0.656    -0.004     0.002     0.113 
 TLU_total    -0.002     0.004     0.679     0.000     0.002     0.963     0.001     0.004     0.694 
 land_area (ha)    -0.007     0.009     0.391    -0.002     0.005     0.711     0.009     0.008     0.266 
 groupmem_num (#)     0.013*     0.007     0.082    -0.010**     0.004     0.013    -0.002     0.007     0.728 
 info_access_market (yes=1)    -0.078**     0.038     0.038     0.019     0.022     0.403     0.060*     0.036     0.096 
 info_processinfo (yes=1)     0.087**     0.039     0.028     0.014     0.024     0.566    -0.100***     0.036     0.006 
 micro_member (yes=1)     0.204***     0.038     0.000    -0.018     0.024     0.441    -0.186***     0.035     0.000 
Pr(credit constraint status):  Pr(0)= 0.5588 P Pr(1)=0.1000  Pr(2)=0.3410 
Source: Post-estimation marginal effects (after MNP regression) using Feed the Future Innovation Laboratory for Small-Scale 
Irrigation (ILSSI) survey data (Tanzania).  Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. dy/dx = discrete change of dummy variable for a 
unit change in a regressor; hh = household; MNP = multinomial probit; TLU = tropical livestock unit. 
With regard to the marginal effects of the covariates, those variables with significant effects on the likelihood 
of credit constraint status (see Table 7) are also important in terms of their effects on influencing  the credit 
constraint condition of a respondent or a household to be either unconstrained or supply-side constrained or 
demand-side constrained. For instance, being a female respondent increases the likelihood of being supply-side 
constrained by 2.6 percent in Ethiopia. In Tanzania, being a female increases the likelihood of demand-side 
constraint by 9.9 percent. Households that are members of local associations are less likely to be credit-
constrained from the supply-side in Ethiopia and Tanzania (by 1.3 percent and 1 percent, respectively) while 
they are less likely to be credit-constrained from the demand-side in Ethiopia by 2.4 percent. MFIs have a large 
statistically significant marginal effect in Tanzania, that is, MFIs reduce the likelihood of a household being 
credit constrained by 18.6 percent. Other statistically significant covariates (in Tables 8 and 9) can be interpreted 
similarly.  
6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS  
Limited access to agricultural credit is seen by many observers as one of the major impediments to agricultural 
technology adoption among smallholder farmers in developing countries. The literature and much of the policy 
discourse focused on supply-side factors—for example, farmers not having access to credit sources—and 
recommended addressing supply-side constraints to improve smallholders’ access to credit through making 
 
20 
more credit available at more affordable rates and more accessible conditions. However, demand-side factors, 
such as borrowers’ risk-averse behavior and financial illiteracy and high transaction costs can also play important 
roles in credit rationing for smallholder farmers.  
This study investigates the agricultural credit constraint status of smallholders in Ethiopia and Tanzania:  
whether the credit constraints faced by smallholders are driven by supply-side factors or by demand-side factors 
or, alternatively, whether credit is not a binding factor for smallholders. Using survey data from Ethiopia and 
Tanzania, the study further examines the factors affecting smallholders’ credit constraint status. Against the 
claims in much of the literature and policy discourse, we find that out of all credit-constrained households in 
the survey sample in Ethiopia and Tanzania, 45 percent and 77 percent, respectively, of the credit constraints 
emanate from demand-side factors such as risk-perceptions, high transaction costs, lack of access to 
information, limited knowledge about agricultural technologies, or a combination of these factors.  
The descriptive analysis reveals that the rate of loan rejections in both countries is low. Of those who have 
applied for loans, 93 percent and 95 percent in Ethiopia and Tanzania, respectively, received the loan amount 
they requested. This high level of approval does not statistically differ between formal and informal sources of 
credit. Of the sampled households, 86 percent in Ethiopia and 54.7 percent in Tanzania report that they are 
not credit constrained.  Demand-side constrained households make up 9.5 percent (in Ethiopia) and 42 percent 
(in Tanzania) of households; whereas 6.7 percent (Ethiopia) and 10.2 percent (Tanzania) of households are 
supply-side constrained—indicating that demand-side constraints are more widespread than supply-side 
constraints.   
Risk aversion behavior (including the fear of default) is reported to be the most limiting demand-side constraint 
in Ethiopia (15 percent) and in Tanzania (69 percent). Purchase of livestock is the single most frequent reason 
for farmers to take a loan in Ethiopia, where it accounts for 45 percent of total loans. Purchase of agricultural 
equipment and inputs for crop production (such as land, tractors, fertilizer, seed, pesticide, and hired labor) 
account for 30 percent and 52 percent of the loans in Ethiopia and Tanzania, respectively. Interestingly, 
irrigation-related costs such as the purchase of motor pumps or tube-wells account for less than 1 percent of 
the loans in the two countries, despite the over-sampling of irrigating households for this survey. Results from 
the multinomial probit analysis suggest the existence of gendered credit constraints, with women being more 
likely to be credit constrained (from both the supply and/or demand sides) than men. Female respondents are 
more likely to be supply-side credit constrained (in Ethiopia) and more likely to be demand-side credit 
constrained (in Tanzania). Access to an MFI and membership in local associations are important factors for 
easing credit constraints in both countries.  
Based on these findings, we suggest three policy implications. First, improving credit access via easing supply-
side constraints alone may not necessarily boost agricultural credit use and technology adoption by smallholders 
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in Ethiopia and Tanzania; efforts to tackle demand-side constraints are also be necessary. Second, whereas the 
key demand-side constraint is farmers’ risk behavior, the key supply-side constraint is related to lack of adequate 
collateral. Policies should focus on easing farmers’ fear of risk: for example, through insurance coverage to 
mitigate key demand-side factors. On the supply-side, mechanisms for enhancing smallholders’ capacity to 
possess bankable collateral should be introduced. Finally, gender-sensitive policies, such as easing collateral 
requirements for women loan applicants should be considered to address the larger constraints women face 
when attempting to access credit.  
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